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politics, the surer ground is usually
ItwontheAmerican
middle ground of perceived moderation. The
"extremes" are construed as those calling for
abortion on demand and those calling for an
ahsolute prohihition of abortion. In that context,
the middle ground is support for the most protective
abortion law that is politically and culturally sustainable. Political calculations aside, however, it is
obvious that Roe and Casey have in no way "settled"
or "resolved" the ahortion conflict. The American
people will not, and should not, accept the word
of the current five-to-four majority as the definitive
word. If President Bush has the chance to make
it, the next nomination to the Court will provoke
a hattle that will turn "Borking" into a synonym
for civility. But more important than the makeup
of the Court, as Justice Scalia forcefully argues, is
the right of the people to deliberate and decide what
justice requires regarding "an issue involving life
and death, freedom and subjugation."
Abraham Lincoln had Dred Scott in mind when
he asserted in his First Inaugural Address: "The
candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the
whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions
of the Supreme Court, . . . the people will have
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their Government into the
hands of that eminent tribunal." As Lincoln would
explain to the Stephen Douglases of today, Casey
is not "the law of the land." It is one wrong decision
of the Court affirming an earlier wrong decision
of the Court. So long as it stands, it must guide
the decisions of other courts, and those in government office must be mindful of that. But the
Constitution is the law of the land and, contrary
to some judicial "realists," the Constitution is not
whatever the Supreme Court says it is. In this land,
in this constitutional order, the people, through
their representatives, make the laws.
Before and after he became President, Lincoln
strove earnestly for the overturn of Dred Scott. He
failed, and war came. It is almost impossible to
imagine that there could be a civil war like the
last one. But the destructive effects of anomie and
anger are already evident as a result of law divorced
from constitutional text, moral argument, and
democratic process. The ever-fragile honds of
civility are unravelled as politics becomes, to
paraphrase Clausewitz, war pursued hy other
means. Lawless law is an invitation to lawlessness.
The four justices dissenting from Casey are not
alarmists, but they are raising an alarm. Those who
refuse to listen hear responsihility for the consequences. "Against the Court," writes Scalia, "are
the twin facts that the American people love
democracy and the American people are not fools."
They will not forever, they will not for long, be
denied democracy and treated like fools.
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William Lloyd Garrison and his fellow abolitionists publicly burned the Constitution, believing it
to be—as interpreted by the Court—"a covenant
with death and an agreement with hell." The Court
minority worries about the angry disillusionment
of millions of Americans who have heen denied their
right to make the case in the political arena for
protective abortion law. But also the main opinion
in Casey is filled with ominous worries about the
moral legitimacy of the Court and the difficulty
of maintaining the rule of law. Indeed, in affirming
Roe, only two justices (Blackmun and Stevens) are
prepared to argue that it was rightly decided law.
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter say that, right or
wrong, precedent must be upheld in order to sustain
the perceived legitimacy of the Court. So that they
will not appear to be "surrendering to political
pressure," they surrender to the political pressure
in favor of Roe. They are right to he anxious about
the moral delegitimation of the Court and the
undermining of the rule of law. The course that
they have chosen is the surest way to the end that
they fear.

Opinion
Getting Rid
Of the Vegetables
David F. Forte
he other day, I cleaned out the vegetable bin
T
in my refrigerator. Some leaves of the head
lettuce had browned, an old zucchini was wrinkled
with age, and a forgotten tomato was shrunken.
I had little regret, for I was replacing the space
with some fresh sweet corn and a nicely formed
Holland pepper.
But some things in our lives cannot be replaced.
A while ago, my eighty-year-old mother collapsed
and was taken unconscious to the local hospital
and placed in the intensive care unit. This very frail
woman had suffered a massive suhdural hemorrhage
and was comatose. The hemorrhage was too extensive for ameliorative surgery. Clinical diagnosis
indicated little cerebral activity beyond brain-stem
function. After twenty-four hours, the attending
physician, whom the family did not know, declared
that he had decided to remove her from the respirator
"to see how she will do on her own." When the
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family asked whether respiration would be readministered if her breathing stopped, the attending
physician stated that he would not do so, and
remained steadfast in his refusal even if the husband
and children insisted upon it.
The family could not fathom the physician's
motives, for he was not forthcoming about his
reasons, nor did he provide much information.
Members of the family then actively sought guidance. The family physician, who had treated my
mother for many years, received permission to
examine her (he was not associated with the hospital). His conclusions, plus those of neurologists
whom memhers of the family were able to contact
by telephone, finally gave us a clear picture of
mother's clinical condition.
With that knowledge, the family agreed to have
her transferred from intensive care, to discontinue
respiration, and not to have resuscitative treatment
administered should there be cardiac or respiratory
arrest. If respiration did cease, we were convinced
it would come from her degenerating hrain function. However, because of the underlying nutritional weakness of the woman, the family insisted
that nutrition and hydration be given. The family
physician supported this resolution, telling us that
this was the "most humane" course under the
circumstances.
The decision was made during the second evening
of my mother's hospitalization, and the night
attending physician entered the orders. The next
day, the respirator was turned off, but my mother
continued to breathe sufficiently well on her own.
She was transferred to a regular ward. However,
the regular attending physician still refused to begin
nutrition. There were no indications of any secondary effects (regurgitation, diarrhea, dehydration
of the mouth) that could not he dealt with. He
simply rejected the family's direction, even though
the treatment requested by the family was supported
by the family physician and, we were led to believe,
by other physicians at the hospital. The nurses
attending my mother were placed in an awkward
position, caught between the family and other
physicians on one side and the attending physician
on the other. During the dehates and discussions
between the family members and the hospital, the
word "vegetable" was applied to my mother. It was
not a harmless sohriquet.
henever we feel the need to free ourselves from
W
the moral command to care for and to treat
our weaker brothers and sisters, the easiest way to
avoid the command of conscience is to deny the
humanity of those dependent on our succor.
Whether the precept is formulated as "the just man
shall care for the widow and the orphan," or "thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," the innate sense
of the other person as like ourselves leads to the
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universal ethical syllogism: we should care for our
fellow humans; Antoinette is a human person;
therefore, we must care for Antoinette.
We can free ourselves of the moral command hy
denying the minor premise, i.e., by declaring that
Antoinette is not fully a human person, or as the
lawyer asked in the New Testament, "But who is
my neighbor?" In short, the empathetic bond can
be broken only by rejecting the personhood of the
other.
One of the most effective ways of stilling the
conscience is to place persons who become inconvenient or offensive in a lower biological order.
Think of the epithets in our day that have been
attached to blacks or Jews as they were a century
ago to the Irish and the American Indian. They
are often described as less than human, and thus
no longer qualify to the status of neighbor, or
brother, or sister.
The medically invented phrase, "Persistent
Vegetative State," has an inevitably pernicious effect
on the way we look at those whose cognitive
functions are drastically, and in most cases permanently and terminally, impaired. With the use of
this phrase, we affix a label that places them not
only outside of the human species but outside of
the entire animal realm. It cannot but affect the
moral outlook of those—attending physicians and
others—who are called upon to treat patients
wearing the hadge of our disregard.
It is true that the phrase was originally intended
to he purely descriptive, denoting that only the
"vegetative," as opposed to the cognitive, functions
of the brain were still operating. But the term is
frequently and widely used for moral effect, no
matter what its original clinical provenance. In the
nineteenth century, the discussion of the "survival
of the fittest" transformed the notion of "fitness"
from an organism's attributes in relation to its
environment to the inapposite conclusion that
humans who could not thrive in the industrialized
economy had no moral claim to survival. Today,
physicians and others who employ the word "vegetable" in describing the condition of comatose
patients and in "counseling" troubled relatives fall
into the same moral error.
There ought to be a more accurate term that
describes not just the medical condition but the
underlying humanity of the afflicted person.
Perhaps something like "Persistent Nonconscious
Condition" would be a more technically descriptive
and less morally freighted substitute, it would, in
fact, communicate a more complete picture of what
is going on.
Think for a moment what "Persistent Nonconscious Condition" would imply. The condition
of the patient is persistent: it resists medical
interventions designed to reverse it. But the condition is nonconscious, not "vegetative." We can
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thus say that the cognitive functions of the hrain
are no longer functioning without implying any
disdain for the person suffering from the condition.
Finally, the patient has a "condition." She has not
been metamorphosed into another "state" of being.
She remains fully human, alheit deeply impaired.
/"^hanging the terminology does not necessarily
V^mean that the appropriate medical treatment
for those with a persistive nonconscious condition
will be any different. Such a change might not,
for example, affect the ethical or legal conditions
necessary for the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. But it would help to assure that we
continue to regard these very ill persons as persons,
entitled to care, comfort, and whatever treatment
is appropriate.
What happened to my mother? After the intervention of other staff physicians, the attending
physician at last agreed to offer her artificial
nutrition and hydration. Over the next few days,
her condition marginally hut noticeahly improved.
Her breathing and heart rate remained steady.
Kidney function was undiminished. No side-effects
from the administration of nutrition were encountered. Members of the family arrived to talk to her,
sing to her, comb her hair. Pupil response improved
slightly. Her right arm was no longer flaccid and
she seemed to squeeze one's hand in response to
questions. A priest who came to see her alone said
that she reached for his hand when he approached
the hed.
We shall never know to what extent these reactions
were genuine responses or our own subjective
transferences. Nor shall we know whether or not
it was the nutrition that provided the family with
time to hegin the process of letting go. It did provide
us the opportunity to determine that while death
would not he opposed, in the interim we would
care for mother as best we could.
Antoinette died seven days after the hemorrhage.
The bleeding had never stopped. Her lungs had
begun to fill with fluid. But when she died, she
died as a person and we grieved for her as a person.
DAVID F. FORTE is Professor of Law at Cleveland
State University and a Bradley Resident Scholar at
the Heritage Foundation.
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Better Than
Their Fathers
Russell E. Saltzman
y fourteen-year-old son has decided he is of
M
the wrong race, culturally at any rate. He wants
to be black—or is it now African-American? Well,
whichever it is, that is what he wants to he.
As you might imagine, this is quite a change
for a skinny hlond kid with a German surname.
I read Black Like Me hack in the 1960s. The book's
white author dyed his skin black and traveled
through the Jim Crow South reporting his experiences, so I know a little about transformations
of this sort. But the cultural evolution my son is
undergoing is way beyond my comprehension. He
has not yet dyed his skin. But I think it is only
a matter of time.
I first became aware of his cultural odyssey when
he begged me for a haircut with racing stripes,
swirls, and his initials. Me, I am pretty much your
buttoned-down type of white guy. The haircuts I
am familiar with do not include patches trimmed
in idiosyncratic patterns. Nonetheless, I do understand the need for individuality among the young,
so I consented. Hair, I reasoned, does have the virtue
of growing out. He wanted five stripes, I did not
want any, and we compromised at three with no
swirls, no initials.
Then came the tight-rolled jeans. This entails
an elaborate, time-consuming process rolling up
jean cuffs tightly against the ankles, urhan warriorstyle. Actually, I think it is a style mostly designed
to consume precious moments every morning—
jeans must he rolled just so and if not, start over,
and over and over and over and over. This panics
me into wondering if the kid ever will get ready
for school on time. Can anybody tell me what
possihle difference there is between a perfectly or
imperfectly tight-rolled cuff?
Next thing I knew, we needed $100 Nikes, Malcolm sunglasses, a Chicago Bulls cap, and an oversized shirt with nothing, but nothing, in the pocket.
I tried to slip his ink pen into his pocket the other
morning and thereby inadvertently committed an
act of rank idiocy. "Homey" is the look he is after,
as in "somebody like 'us'." Put a pen in the pocket
and the kid might end up looking more or less
like, well, one of "them." Meaning me, I guess.
But okay. At least these are clothes to which I can
still relate.
School officials, though, confiscated the cap.
Rival hats create prohlems among rival students,
the vice principal told me when I answered the
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